We examine the heterogeneous relationship between the adoption of electronic medical records (EMR) and hospital operating costs at thousands of US hospitals between 1996 and 2009. Combining data from multiple sources, we first identify a puzzle that has been seen in prior studies: Adoption of EMR is generally associated with a slight increase in costs. We draw on the literature on information technology and productivity to analyze why this average effect arises, and explain why it masks important differences over time, across locations, and across hospitals. We find evidence consistent with this approach, namely, that: (1) EMR adoption is initially associated with a rise in costs; (2) EMR adoption at hospitals in favorable conditions -such as urban locations -leads to a decrease in costs after three years; and (3) Hospitals in unfavorable conditions experience a sharp increase in costs even after six years.
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I. Introduction
More than a quarter century ago economists engaged in a vigorous debate about the benefits from investment in information technology (IT) in manufacturing and services. That debate was encapsulated in the Solow 'Productivity Paradox'-"You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics" (Solow 1987) . That debate eventually faded from view, in part because the data began to reject it.
Over time it was found that firms achieved productivity benefits from IT, just with a lag. Moreover, explanations for the lag emerged from considerable work on IT use in enterprises. The challenges to productivity benefits were due to the costly adaptations required for the successful implementation of new IT. In time, it was found that the firms realizing benefits from their IT investments were those that had made complementary investments in areas such as worker skills and organizational decision rights.
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A new manifestation of this debate has surfaced around the use of electronic medical records (EMR).
A small sampling of research from the last half dozen years provides a sense of the uncertainty about the productivity benefits from these investments. The Congressional Budget Office states: "No aspect of health information technology (i.e., EMR) entails as much uncertainty as the magnitude of its potential benefits" (Congressional Budget Office 2008) . A widely cited 2005 report by the RAND Corporation, published in the leading policy journal Health Affairs, estimates that widespread adoption of EMR by hospitals and doctors could reduce annual health spending by as much as $81 billion while simultaneously leading to better outcomes (Hillestad et al. 2005) . Jaan Sidorov, a medical director with the Geisinger Health Plan, an early adopter of EMR, published a response to the RAND report in Health Affairs. Sidorov (2006) highlights the high cost of adoption and cites evidence that EMR leads to greater health spending and lower productivity. Other recent studies, cited below, also fail to find consistent evidence that EMR savings offset adoption costs.
What impact does EMR have on a key determinant of an existing organization's productivity, such as its operating costs? We view EMR as a type of business process innovation, one that involves not only 2 investments in IT but also changes in the operational practices within the adopting organization. If EMR is viewed in this way, how does that change the understanding of EMR's impact? We argue that prior literature has missed important features of EMR by not building on prior research studying the adoption and productivity benefits of large scale enterprise IT and "insider econometrics" studies of IT adoption. 2 Building on this prior research, we stress the complementary assets that reduce the costs associated with "co-invention," which is the process of adapting an innovation to unique circumstances and turning the overall change into a net benefit to the enterprise. These complementary assets come from several sources. Local resources may be available as market services, such as expertise in implementing similar business process innovations, or widespread spillovers in how to use the IT. Resources available internally to the enterprise, such as expertise with other business processes inside the enterprise, may also help implement the business process innovation and often cannot be purchased from markets in the short run. To summarize, variance in local and internal resources provides an explanation for why the payoff from EMR may be delayed, and for why we observe variance in the returns to investments in enterprise IT across locations.
We conduct an empirical examination of the impact of EMR adoption on hospital operating costs during the period 1996 to 2009, using the prior research on enterprise IT adoption to frame the analysis and results. The data come from several sources linking hospital costs to EMR adoption and the potential for complementarities. Our main analysis regresses logged operating costs on EMR adoption, hospital fixed effects, and a large number of controls. We focus on whether the impact of EMR is greater for hospitals that are positioned to exploit available complementarities. Thus, our key independent variable is the interaction between EMR adoption and the presence of local complements, as measured by the IT-intensity of local industry. Our key identification assumption is that EMR adoption is not correlated with unobservable cost factors that are differentially trending in hospitals with locally available complementary inputs relative to hospitals that lack these inputs. We explain below why we believe that this is a reasonable 3 assumption; even so, we show robustness to instrumenting for EMR adoption using hospital proximity to EMR vendors and EMR adoption in alliance systems and geographically linked markets.
We find the evidence consistent with our reframing. The timing of cost savings is consistent with what we would expect given the literature on the productivity paradox in IT. For the average hospital, the gains from EMR adoption appear with some delay. Moreover, there is significant heterogeneity in the gains achieved that depend upon the local availability of complementary factors such IT workers. We focus on costs because much of the political discussion has emphasized cost savings, and because the multi-product nature of hospitals makes it easier to measure the implications of EMR for costs than for productivity.
However, our focus on costs means that we cannot use our data to rule out the possibility that our results are paralleled by opposite results on clinical benefits, though the prior literature, including Agha (2012) , Tucker (2011), and McCullough et al (2010) , have found clinical benefits on average to be small. 3 We find that hospitals that adopted EMR between 1996 and 2009 did not experience a statistically significant decrease in costs on average. In fact, under many specifications, costs rose after EMR adoption, particularly for the more advanced EMR systems. However, this effect is mediated by measures of the availability of technology skills in the local labor market. Specifically, in strong IT locations, costs can fall sharply after the first year of adoption to below pre-adoption levels. In weak IT locations, costs remain above pre-adoption levels indefinitely. Overall, hospitals in IT-intensive markets enjoyed a statistically significant 3.4 percent decrease in costs from three years after adoption of basic EMR and a marginally significant 2.2 percent decrease in costs from three years after adoption of advanced EMR. These results are significantly better than the up to 4 percent increase in costs after adoption by hospitals in other markets.
Figure 1 displays these general patterns in the raw data, comparing hospitals that adopt basic and advanced EMR before the adoption period, during the adoption period, and after the adoption period. For basic EMR, costs do not fall until three years after adoption. For non-IT-intensive locations, costs rise sharply in the year of adoption, and then fall back. For IT-intensive locations, costs fall with adoption, and 4 are substantially lower three years after adoption. For advanced EMR, the patterns are similar: costs rise in the period of adoption for non-IT-intensive locations and fall over time for the other hospitals.
We provide evidence that the benefits of strong IT locations arise in part from an agglomeration of IT employment in (other) IT hospitals. Hospitals in locations with strong HIT employment enjoyed a statistically significant 6.9 percent decrease in costs from three years after adoption of basic EMR and a statistically significant 7.3 percent decrease in costs from three years after adoption of advanced EMR.
However, concentration of IT employment in other industries is not associated with greater benefits from adopting basic or advanced EMR. Controlling for strong HIT employment, costs still fall more rapidly in strong IT locations than in weak ones. In short, one benefit of strong IT locations is a thicker labor market for HIT workers, though other benefits persist as well.
We also show results suggesting that complementary skills can be found internally in the hospital. For advanced EMR, the initial increase in costs is mitigated substantially if hospitals already have substantial software experience. Hospitals without experience are hurt in the short run for the most sophisticated technologies. We do find, however, that within a short time inexperienced hospitals can make up the difference. Specifically, the difference in costs after adoption for hospitals with and without internal expertise disappears within three years. This suggests that, in contrast to complementary assets that depend on a location with favorable agglomeration economies, some complementary assets to business process innovation can be acquired relatively quickly.
These findings have several implications. As annual U.S. healthcare expenditures climb towards $3 trillion and with spending forecast to exceed $4.5 trillion by 2020, many analysts hope that electronic medical records (EMR) can stem the tide (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services). For example, David
Cutler and Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin make EMR the centerpiece of their "Two Trillion Dollar" solution for modernizing the health care system (Buntin and Cutler 2009 We proceed as follows. Sections II and III describe the institutional setting for EMR, and some of the prior evidence about its effects on hospitals. This motivates a comparison in Section IV between EMR and the adoption of IT inside other organizations, which leads to a reframing of several key hypotheses.
Sections V and VI present data and results. Section VII concludes.
II. What is EMR?
EMR is a catchall expression used to characterize a wide range of information technologies used by hospitals to keep track of utilization, costs, outcomes, and billings. In practice, EMR includes, but is not limited to:
• A Clinical Data Repository (CDR) is a real time database that combines disparate information about patients into a single file. This information may include test results, drug utilization, pathology reports, patient demographics, and discharge summaries.
• Clinical Decision Support Systems (CDSS) use clinical information to help providers diagnose patients and develop treatment plans.
• Order Entry provides electronic forms to streamline hospital operations (replacing faxes and paper forms).
• Computerized Provider Order Entry (CPOE) is a more sophisticated type of electronic order entry and involves physician entry of orders into the computer network to medical staff and to departments such as pharmacy or radiology. CPOE systems typically include patient information and clinical guidelines, and can flag potential adverse drug reactions.
• 
III. Evidence on the Potential Savings from EMR
Has adoption of EMR reduced hospital costs? This section reviews prior evidence, stressing the absence of work focusing on operational savings, lack of emphasis on complementarities with the labor market, and the absence of accounting for the functional heterogeneity of EMR's components. This discussion will motivate our concerns and our approach to framing the study of EMR's impact on productivity using past research that emphasized enterprise IT as a business process innovation.
Every EMR study remarks on the expense. One prominent estimate, from the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO 2008) , estimates that the cost of adopting EMR for office-based physicians is between $25,000 and $45,000 per physician, with annual maintenance costs of $3000 to $9000. For a typical urban hospital, these figures range from $3-$9 million for adoption and $700,000-$1.35 million for maintenance. Additionally, adoption appears to have little impact on the quality of care, measured by patient mortality, medical complication rates, adverse drug events, and readmission rates. While not directly about costs, Lee, McCullough, and Town (2012) document small positive effects of hospital IT on productivity.
None of the studies frame EMR in the context of the prior literature on enterprise IT. In other words, there is no examination of factors that shape availability of complementary components such as local expertise or prior experience with related technology. This may be due to a lack of familiarity with the theoretical frameworks that would suggest such differential effects. In the next section, we offer such a framework, based on research on the productivity of large scale IT projects in enterprises, and develop some specific implications for the deployment of EMR.
IV. Information Technology and Complementarities
The existing literature on effective implementation of IT within businesses has emphasized the view of IT as a business process innovation. 6 Such innovations alter organizational practices, generally with the intent of improving services, reducing operational costs, and taking advantage of new opportunities to match new services to new operational practices. Typically this type of innovation involves changes in the discretion given to employees, changes to the knowledge and information that employees are expected to retain and employ, and changes to the patterns of communications between employees and administrators within an organization.
Because important innovation in enterprise IT occurs on a large scale, it typically involves a range of investments, both in computing hardware and software, and in communications hardware and software. It also involves retraining employees and redesigning organizational architecture, such as hierarchy, lines of control, compensation patterns, and oversight norms. In the discussion below, we draw on a wide literature to explain a number of common misunderstandings about business process innovations.
For example, there is a misperception that new IT hardware or software yields the vast majority of productivity gains without the need for adaptation by the firm. Prior research has shown that each generation of IT is not readily interchangeable with older products or processes, meaning that the initial investment often does not generate a substantial productivity gain until after complementary investments, adaptations, and organizational changes (e.g. Bresnahan and Greenstein 1996; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002; Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2007; Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2012) . Many of these necessary changes are made long after the initial adoption. Hence, it is common for IT investments to have no or negative returns in the short run before yielding positive returns. Among the functions mentioned in EMR, for example, CPOE generates many changes to routine processes. These changes often take time to make, and their productivity gains can come long after the initial rollout.
Thus, business process innovation is not equivalent to installing shrink-wrap software for a PC that works instantly, or merely after training of staff. Instead, prior studies stress the importance of coinvention, the post-adoption invention of complementary business processes and adaptations aimed at making IT adoption useful (Bresnahan and Greenstein 1996) . The initial investment in IT is not sufficient for ensuring productivity gains. Those gains depends on whether the employees of the adopting organization-in the case of hospitals, administrative staff, doctors, and nurses-find new uses to take advantage of the new capabilities, and/or invent new processes for many unanticipated problems. For example, at one ophthalmology unit at a teaching hospital, the physicians could not find a way to put their traditional "hand-drawings" into the new formats. They found that the new electronic formats sometimes 11 reduced the richness of the information they could record.
This relates to another common misunderstanding: expectations that the entire cost of investment is incurred as monetary expense. Non-monetary costs comprise a substantial risk from installing a business process innovation. Prior studies emphasize the cost of delays, for example. Delays can arise from nonconvexities in investment (e.g., all the wiring must be installed before the communications routines can be tested), the technical necessity to invest in one stage of a project only after another is completed (e.g., the
client cannot be modified until the servers work as designed), lack of interoperability during upgrades (which some software handles better than others), and cognitive limits (e.g., staff does not anticipate idiosyncratic issues until a new process is at their fingertips). Moreover, interruptions to ongoing operations generate large opportunity costs in foregone services that can be substantially mediated with internal resources (e.g., development of middleware by in-house IT staff) for which there may be no market price or, for that matter, no potential for resale. Thus, planning is another common difficulty in IT adoption. Though the installation of any substantial business process innovation requires planning -i.e., administrative effort by the enterprise in advance of installation -such planning alone rarely ends the administrative tasks required to generate productivity gains. Administrative effort does not cease after installation, and continues throughout implementation.
Hiring and training personnel generates use of new hardware, software, and procedures. New users in new settings then notice unanticipated problems, which generates new insight about unexpected issues.
As an example of the necessary adjustments and co-invention required for successful EMR investment, consider one large teaching hospital that supported a diverse and geographically dispersed affiliate network. 8 The IT staff configured the records for patients to suit the needs of physicians treating severe medical issues. The central hospital saw many severely ill patients, since it was a major trauma center for its region. After rolling out this new system, the doctors at the satellite campuses complained of wasting time "cleaning up the records" because no responsibility was assigned for updating the records after an 12 urgent event. The doctors at satellite campuses also frequently found themselves wading through many screens when routine issues did not require it, and while the patient was present, diminishing the patient experience. It also lengthened the physician's day, as they spent time updating records. In this simple example, gaining the maximal productivity gains required tailoring the software to the specific types of users and the specific setting, as well as implementing procedures to keep it updated.
Two key empirical implications arise from this discussion. First, given that there was considerable heterogeneity across US locations in the availability of complementary factors, such as skilled labor and knowledge spillovers Greenstein 2005, 2012) For example, software developers may be able to share common tools for design, development, and testing (Banker and Slaughter 1997 ), or they may be able to reuse code (Barnes and Bollinger 1991) . Software development may also have learning economies (Attewell 1992 ) that through experience reduce the unit costs of new IT projects. Much prior research in the costs of innovative activity has also presumed experience with related projects lowers the costs of innovation (Cohen and Levinthal 1990 ).
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V. Data
We use a variety of data sources to examine the relationship between EMR adoption and costs. In particular, the data for this study matches data on EMR adoption from a well-known private data source on health IT investments (HIMSS Analytics) with cost data from the Medicare Hospital Cost Report. We add data from the American Hospital Association's (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals. We obtain regional controls and information on local complementary factors from the decennial U.S. Census and from U.S.
County Business Patterns data. We supplement the sources above with information on lagged hospital-level IT experience and local IT workforce from another private source on IT investment, the Harte Hanks
Computer Intelligence Database. Our data are organized as an unbalanced panel, with data available every year from 1996 to 2009. Electronic Medical Records, which we listed above. These closely represent the kind of EMR applications that the RAND study and others believe will lead to dramatic cost savings and quality enhancements.
We aggregate the five EMR applications into two broad categories that we label "basic" and "advanced" EMR, similar to our prior framework for enterprise IT (e.g. Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein 12 The number of observations column in table 2 shows a key challenge within and across data sources: missing data. There is considerable variation across hospitals and years for each of the variables. We simply drop observations with any missing data from our main specifications, though we document that results are robust to some alternatives. 13 Community hospitals provide treatments for a wide range of diseases and have relatively short (less than 30 day) average lengths of stay. There are approximately 5000 community hospitals in the United States. HIMSS hospitals are more likely than average to be privately owned and tend to be larger than non-reporting hospitals.
2012). Applications within each of these categories involve similar costs of adoption and require similar types of co-invention to be used successfully. We say that a hospital has basic EMR if it has adopted a clinical data repository (CDR), clinical decision support systems (CDSS), or order entry/communication.
We say that a hospital has advanced EMR if it has adopted either computerized practitioner order entry (CPOE) or physician documentation, applications that are more difficult to implement and more difficult to operate successfully due to the need for physician training and involvement. Analyses of health IT adoption, such as the HIMSS Forecasting Model, consider advanced EMR applications to represent the final stage of EMR adoption (HIMSS Analytics 2011). Hospital costs. Our primary dependent variable is equal to total hospital operating expenses per admission. There are several reasons why we study the impact of EMR on costs and not productivity. From a policy perspective, the debate on EMR focuses on two dimensions, costs and outcomes. From an econometric perspective, hospitals are multi-product firms. It may be easier to specify cost as the dependent variable and include ad hoc controls for product mix than to try to define output on a uniform scale. This may explain why there are many published studies of hospital cost functions but few published studies of 16 hospital production functions.
We collect data on hospital costs from Medicare Cost Reports. Hospitals are required to report costs to Medicare so that Medicare can compute national reimbursement rates. While these cost data are not audited, hospitals have little incentive to report inaccurately. The cost measure that we use includes the fully amortized operating costs across the entire hospital. These will include the costs of property, plant, and equipment depreciation, but exclude costs of services such as parking garages and public cafeterias.
14 Physician salaries are generally excluded from this measure, except for in-house staff with administrative roles, or those whose billing contributes to hospital revenue, such as radiologists. While our primary measure is total operating expenses per admission, we also show robustness to using total expenses and a case-mix weight on admissions. 15 In some years Cost Report data are missing; in our estimation sample 11 percent of hospital observations are missing cost data. We interpolate values for these missing cost data using the geometric mean of adjacent year costs though results are robust to excluding these observations. Table 2 shows that, on average, costs rise considerably over the sample period (from 9.065 to 9.885 in logged values) but there is a great deal of variation across hospitals.
Because operating expenses include amortized investments in EMR, it would be unsurprising to see increases in costs around the time EMR adoption, reflecting increased purchases of computing and networking hardware and software. We do not expect any such mechanical bump in costs to be correlated with the local IT environment.
We emphasize results on aggregate costs to the hospital, and show robustness to labor costs. While the Cost Report does provide a breakdown of costs by department (e.g. diagnostic radiology, housekeeping, pharmacy), we do not believe these data are reliable reflections of the costs in those areas. In particular, there appears to be substantial accounting discretion in how costs are allocated within the hospital. For example, housekeeping costs range from -$16 per admit to $70,000 per admit with a mean of $196 and a 14 Depreciation rules are standardized across hospitals. For further details on these rules, see the documentation for the cost report data available at https://www.cms.gov/CostReports/02_HospitalCostReport.asp#TopOfPage. 15 We obtained annual data on the case mix of Medicare patients for 87% of the sample available from the CMS website (https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/Historical-Impact-Files-for-FY-1994-through-Present.html). While Medicare case mix does not match actual case mix, we still document that our results are robust to (i) including the Medicare case mix as a control and (ii) normalizing the cost per admit by the Medicare case mix index. Our main specification assumes that the case mix does not change simultaneously with EMR adoption for reasons other than EMR adoption.
standard deviation of $523. Thus, our understanding of these data is that the aggregate costs (and aggregate labor costs) are reliable, but the cost breakdown by department is subject to substantial variation in accounting norms across hospitals.
Hospital characteristics. We obtain hospital characteristics from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey. The survey contains details about hospital ownership, service offerings, and financials. We match AHA, Cost Report, and HIMSS data using the hospital Medicare ID and retain only matching hospitals. Specifically, we start with 4915 hospitals in the HIMSS data, drop to 4819 when merging with the Cost Report, and drop to 4493 when merging with the AHA data. We use information from the AHA data and the Medicare Cost Report to exclude several types of hospitals whose costs might be affected by unobservable and/or idiosyncratic factors unrelated to EMR adoption. In particular, we exclude federal hospitals, as well as hospitals that are not defined as short-term general medical and surgical hospitals. (The hospitals that we exclude are not usually considered to be "community" hospitals). Finally, we dropped a small number of hospitals that report very low total costs (less than $100,000) over one or more years in our sample period. After dropping these, the minimum cost is $1.2 million and the average cost is $61 million.
Our final data set contains 4231 hospitals for which we have data on basic EMR adoption for 2228 and data on advanced EMR adoption for 3306. We observe 96 percent of the hospitals in all fourteen years of the data (though both cost and EMR adoption information may not be available in all years).
We use the AHA data to compute the following covariates 16 :
• Hospital size: We include number of outpatient visits and number of inpatient days. We also include 1996 values of number of beds and total number of admissions.
• Integration with physicians: We include indicators of whether the hospital operates an independent practice association or a management service organization hospital (as of 1996).
• Hospital ownership: We include for-profit ownership, non-secular non-profit ownership, nonprofit church ownership, equity model hospital, or foundation hospital (in 1996) . 16 In a small number of cases, specific pieces of the AHA data are missing for a hospital in a given year but available in other years. In these cases, we impute the missing value using the other years though results are robust to dropping these observations.
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• Our main measure of complementary factors is the percentage of local firms that are in IT-using and IT-producing industries. We measure the fraction of firms in IT-using and IT-producing industries in the county as of 1995 from the US Census County Business Patterns data. National aggregate data shows that such industries have unusually high returns from investment in IT in the 1990s. We define these industries using the classification reported in Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005, p. 93 ).
18 Table 2 shows that 43 percent 19 of the hospitals in our data are in counties in the top quartile in IT intensity.
Our second measure of local complementary factors combines county-level income, education, population, and IT intensity. This measure, also used in Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2012) , defines "high all factors" counties as those with over 150,000 population that are in the top quartile in income, education, and IT intensity; 23 percent of the hospitals in our sample fit this criteria.
Third, we include a dummy for whether the hospital is located in an MSA. Urban locations will benefit from additional supply of complementary factors, including thicker labor markets, third party services firms, and better infrastructure. In particular, urban location has been shown to be correlated with lower costs for enterprise IT adoption in a variety of industries Greenstein 2005, 2008) .
To measure local availability of IT skills, we create two measures of local employment of programmers using the CI database: the number of programmers working in hospitals and the number of programmers working outside of hospitals. The CI database contains establishment-and firm-level data on characteristics such as the number of employees, personal computers per employee, number of programmers, and the use of specific software applications. We use data from the 1996 and 2002 data releases. A number of researchers have used this data previously to study adoption of IT (e.g., Bresnahan and Greenstein 1996) and the productivity implications of IT investment (e.g., Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002 , Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003 , Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2012 . As has been discussed elsewhere (e.g., Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein 2005) , this data set represents one of the most comprehensive sources of information on the IT investments of private firms available: for example, as of 2000, it comprised roughly one half of all US establishments over 100 employees For each establishment in the CI database, we take the midpoint of the (categorical) measure of the number of programmers. For each county-industry, we add up the number of programmers. 19 We weight these by comparing the county-industry employment in our sample to total county-industry employment, where the latter is estimated from the US Census County Business Patterns data. Our measure total non- 
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health programmers is the weighted sum across all non-health industries. 20 For our measure of health programmers, we simply compute the (weighted) employment for hospitals, differencing out the focal hospital. We show results using both the 1996 and 2002 CI databases (and the County Business Patterns from the same year). As we do for strong IT locations, we compute the top quartile for both health and nonhealth programmers.
IT capabilities. We also use the CI database to obtain measures of historical hospital-level internal IT capabilities. For capabilities of hospitals, we gather data from 1996 on the number of computer programmers and numbers of business and clinical software applications at the hospital, which we interpret as measures of hospital experience with IT. We merge this information into our main data set using hospital names. Unfortunately, because the CI database is itself a sample from a broader population of establishments, there is a significant loss of data from merging these two data sources: the number of hospitals in our sample falls by more than half in the regressions that use the CI database to measure internal hospital experience in software in 1996.
V. Empirical strategy and results
We perform linear regression with hospital and year fixed effects on an unbalanced panel of hospitals observed annually from 1996 to 2009. We proceed in four stages. First, we regress logged costs per patient on different measures of EMR adoption. We document that costs appear to rise on average after adoption.
Second, we decompose the rise in costs by years since adoption and show that the rise is largest in the first year of adoption. Third, we examine different margins of complementarity, and show that the results are much stronger for location than for internal IT experience. In particular, we show that the results are strongest in locations with a large number of HIT workers. These results provide suggestive evidence of a difference between complementarities related to available internal expertise and complementarities related to agglomeration economies. Finally, we examine robustness, identification, and plausibility with a variety of further tests.
Overall effects:
We begin by examining the relationship between (the log of) total administrative costs per admit (c it ) and EMR:
(1) Log(c it ) =αX it +β t X i +γ t Z i +θEMR it +τ t +µ i +ε it , Here, τ t captures average changes to costs over time; µ i is a hospital-specific fixed effect that gets differenced out in the estimation; and EMR it is a discrete variable for whether hospital i had adopted a particular EMR technology by time t. Thus, θ identifies our main effect of interest. We assume that ε it is a normal i.i.d. variable and calculate heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered by hospital.
We include three categories of controls. First, X it are controls for hospital characteristics that change over time: inpatient days and outpatient visits. We choose to allow inpatient days and outpatient visits to vary over time to be consistent with prior work on hospital costs that specified these with a translog function (e.g., Dranove and Lindrooth 2003) . Second, X i are all other controls for hospital characteristics.
These include beds, type of hospital, ownership status, and discharges. We are concerned that EMR adoption may drive changes in these variables, so including contemporaneous values would be an error. We take their 1996 values and interact them with a linear time trend. Third, Z i are controls for county-specific characteristics (such as population and income) that do not vary sufficiently over time for changes in their values to have much identifying power. However, the location-level characteristics do have power to identify cost trends. Therefore, we interact these local characteristics with a linear time trend.
For this part of our analysis, our identification relies on the assumption that any systematic changes in hospital costs after EMR adoption are captured by the changes in the hospital-level controls over time and the time trends for the locations. 21 Put another way, adoption of EMR is uncorrelated with unobservable cost trends that were experienced differentially by adopting hospitals. Table 3 shows the results of this regression. For columns 1 to 7, the dependent variable is total operating costs per admission, as defined in the AHA data. For column 8 and 9, we use total hospital operating costs (i.e., we do not divide by admissions). Columns 1 to 3 use the specific EMR technologies that together we label "basic EMR"; columns 4 and 8 use the aggregated basic EMR measure (which is equal to one when the hospital has adopted any of the three technologies); column 5 and 6 use the EMR technologies that make up "advanced EMR"; columns 7 and 9 use the aggregated advanced EMR measure.
The results suggest that, on average, EMR does not reduce costs. Instead, in many specifications, EMR is associated with a positive and significant increase in costs of about one to two percent.
Effects by time since adoption: As discussed above, a rich literature on IT productivity has documented that IT adoption affects productivity with a lag. Table 4 examines the extent to which the increase in costs is driven by initial adoption costs such as co-invention and learning new processes. Specifically, Table 4 splits the EMR variable into seven pieces, based on time since adoption:
We therefore identify separate coefficients for the first year observed after adoption and for each of the six subsequent years. For the dummy for the sixth year, we use "adopt at least six years earlier." The hospital fixed effects mean these coefficients should be interpreted relative to the period before adoption.
Costs often rise significantly immediately after adoption, increasing 1.9 percent for advanced EMR.
After the first period, costs gradually return to the pre-adoption levels. Generally, the costs return to the pre-adoption levels faster for the basic EMR technologies than for advanced EMR. This is consistent with the prior literature on enterprise IT: initial adoption costs are high because of disruptions to established processes, over time these disruptions diminish, and more complicated technologies take more time to be effectively implemented. It is also consistent with Agha (2012) who finds a transitory increase in total medical expenditures upon adoption but that this increase goes away over time to yield no essentially no change in costs. Table 5 sets up the sparser specifications that are used in the remainder of the paper to facilitate interpretation. In particular, it focuses on the aggregate measures of basic and advanced EMR and it combines individual years into two variables: "adopt in previous three year period" and "adopt at least three years earlier". As expected, the results are similar to where EMR it-3 is a dummy variable for whether the hospital adopted EMR at least three years earlier and IT_INTENSE i is a measure of whether the location is IT-intensive. Table 6 examines three distinct measures of IT-intensity: (i) a dummy variable for whether the hospital is in a county that is in the top quartile in terms of IT-using and IT-producing industry, (ii) a dummy variable for whether the hospitals is in a county with high population, income, education and IT-intensive industry (labeled "high all factors" in Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2012)), and (iii) a dummy variable for whether the hospital is in an MSA. For these estimates, we add a control for these measures interacted with a time trend.
Recall that in the previous analysis our identification assumption was that adoption of EMR was uncorrelated with unobservable cost trends that were experienced differentially by adopting hospitals. In this analysis, which is central to our study, our identifying assumption is weaker. We do not need to assume that adopters and non-adopters experience the same trends in unobservables. Rather, we need to assume that there is no difference in unobservable cost trends around the time of IT adoption in high IT-intensity markets versus low IT-intensity markets; i.e., there is no differential selection on trends in unobservables.
Although we can think of no obvious economic reason why this assumption would be violated, in later specifications we will instrument for adoption. Another identification assumption that we require is that hospitals do not relocate to respond to lower EMR adoption costs, and that hospitals cannot easily hire to overcome local IT deficiencies. That is, we assume that an IT-intensive environment requires sufficient local scale, and that hospitals will be a small part of a local IT environment.
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The first two rows show that costs per admission do not fall in non-IT-intensive counties. In contrast, 22 Our data are consistent with this assumption: for the average county in our data, less than 1% of IT workers are employed in hospitals.
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for advanced EMR, costs per admission appear to rise substantially in such locations. The differences between IT-intensive locations and other locations increase after the initial adoption period. For basic EMR, after three years, costs fall a statistically significant 3.4 percent in IT-intensive counties while the coefficient is positive but insignificant in all other counties. For advanced EMR, after three years, costs fall a marginally significant (p-value is 0.09) 2.2 percent in IT-intensive counties while costs rise 3.8 percent in other counties.
Taking the point estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 at face value, a hospital that installed basic EMR in a favorable location had an average cost reduction of 3.4 percent starting three years after installation, while an installation of advanced EMR in the same location experienced a cost reduction of 2.2 percent. In contrast, a hospital in a poor location would experience an (insignificant) rise in costs of 1.3 percent from three years after adoption of basic EMR and a strongly significant rise of 3.8 percent after adoption of advanced EMR. With average annual operating costs in the tens of millions, these differences are substantial.
Effects by local IT workers:
We next explore whether the difference between IT-intensive locations and other locations is driven by workers in the hospital IT sector, or by IT workers of any kind.
Specifically, as described above, we use measures of the number of IT programmers (from 1996 and 2002) in hospitals and in all other (non-health) industries in the county: This analysis therefore compares whether the correlations between EMR adoption, IT intensity, and costs are more strongly driven by local hospital IT expertise or by IT expertise across other sectors. As noted above, HIT shares many features with other kinds of enterprise IT, so it is possible that labor skills and knowledge will transfer across industries. Consistent with columns 1 to 4 of Table 7 , we find that local hospital IT employment is strongly correlated with reduced costs. In addition, we find a weakly persistent relationship between IT-intensive locations and reduced costs, even controlling for hospital IT employment. We interpret this to suggest that local expertise in hospital IT is particularly important but it may not explain all of the difference between IT-intensive counties and other counties.
Effects by hospital IT experience: Internal expertise also can mitigate the costs of adoption of a new process innovation. Importantly, unlike local factors, a hospital may be able to overcome some of these issues by hiring outside expertise. As measures of hospital IT experience, we examine business software applications, clinical software applications, and programmers employed (all measured in 1996, at the beginning of the sample). These can be seen as measures of whether the hospital had prior experience in managing software. Given that the sample is reduced by more than half when we merge in the CI database that contains experience information, the additional insight imposes a significant cost on the analysis.
Still, Table 8 suggests a striking contrast to the effects of local IT-intensity. Internal expertise appears 26 to have little impact on the relationship between basic EMR and costs. It does appear related to reduced costs for hospitals that adopt advanced EMR, but only in the first period after adoption. For each of the three measures, a one standard deviation change yields a 2.5 to 3.9 percent decrease in costs per admittance in the initial three years after advanced EMR adoption. Internal expertise therefore seems particularly important for the most advanced applications that might involve a great deal of co-invention to be successfully employed but any cost disadvantages from a lack of expertise are quickly overcome. We speculate that this might be because it is not difficult for the hospital to hire the expertise from outside.
Broadly, the main message of Tables 6, 7 , and 8 is consistent with this study's framing, using the results of prior literature on enterprise IT to understand EMR adoption.
Robustness, identification, and plausibility: Next, we explore the degree to which we can claim our main results in table 6 are causal and general. There are four potential types of concerns. First, there might be an omitted variable correlated with EMR adoption and with costs. Second, and related to this, it is possible that unobservable changes in cost drivers are associated with EMR adoption differentially in high and low IT intensity markets. Third, it is possible that anticipated changes in costs drive EMR adoption (rather than EMR adoption driving changes in costs). Fourth, the large amount of missing data may mean that our sample is not representative.
In anticipation of these concerns, we included in our previous analyses hospital and time fixed effects as well as a very large set of covariates as controls. In order to address additional concerns we conduct three types of analyses, examining the timing of the relationship between EMR adoption and cost changes, instrumental variables analysis, and robustness to alternative specifications such as alternative treatments of the missing variables.
In Figure 2 , we examine the timing of the relationship between EMR adoption and changes in costs.
Specifically, we focus on eventual adopters and exploit variation across hospitals in year of adoption. We run the equation (2) In Table 9 , we apply instruments for EMR adoption to explore concerns about the direction of causality; one possible concern is that hospitals (especially those in IT-intensive locations) anticipating a reduction in costs will buy an EMR system. While the results are, at best, weakly significant, the signs are consistent with the results of the main specifications. We emphasize three instruments that have some power in the first stage (shown in the Appendix) and, under certain assumptions, may not directly impact costs. First, we use geographic variation in hospitals that belong to multi-location hospital systems and use EMR adoption by competing hospitals in other counties within the same systems as an instrument. This instrument is similar to the one used in Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2008) to examine the impact of internal expertise in IT on advanced internet adoption by US businesses. The identification assumption is that adoption by competing hospitals in other geographic markets will increase the likelihood of EMR adoption by hospitals within the same system but in those other geographic markets. This will decrease the costs of EMR adoption by the focal hospital but should not affect its other costs.
Second, we use the distance from the hospital to the closest EMR vendor as of 1996 (and interact this with a time trend). The identification assumption is that hospitals near EMR vendor offices will have lower costs for learning about EMR systems.
Third, we use information on hospital alliances and use adoption by other hospitals in the same alliance as an instrument for own adoption. The identification assumption is that adoption by other hospitals in the alliance might lead to lower EMR adoption costs or better information about EMR but will not be coincident with trends in costs for other operating procedures. Given that we think the third 28 instrument requires the strongest assumptions, we show results for all three and for just the first two. In the Appendix, we show results for each instrument separately.
Because the instruments are at the hospital level rather than the hospital-year level, we focus on one covariate for EMR adoption: whether the hospital adopted EMR at least three years earlier. There is variation in the power of the instruments in the first stage, though they are generally weak with first stage F-statistics ranging from 2.00 to 23.23. The competing hospitals instrument is the most powerful; it works best for basic adoption but also for advanced adoption. The distance to nearest vendor instrument is quite weak. The hospital alliance instrument has some power for advanced adoption but little for basic adoption. Column 1 of Table 9 shows that the coefficients on the main effect of basic EMR adoption turn negative when we instrument for adoption. The main effect is positive (but not significant) for advanced EMR adoption in column 2. Perhaps more importantly, columns 3 and 4 show that the signs of the results on the difference between IT-intensive counties and other counties hold, and the results are weakly significant for basic EMR. Columns 5 through 8 provide nearly identical qualitative results with just two instruments. While not conclusive, we view the instrumental variables analysis as suggestive that our result on the difference between IT intensive locations and other locations is unlikely to be driven by anticipated changes in costs leading to more adoption.
In the Appendix, we address other concerns regarding specification. We show that results are robust to dropping all controls, to adding controls for time-varying hospital characteristics and the Medicare case mix index, and to changing the dependent variable to labor costs per admit, direct costs per admit, or total costs per admit weighted by the Medicare case mix index. We also show that the results are robust to including only those hospitals observed in all years (a balanced panel) and to dropping locations in which hospital IT workers make up a substantial fraction of IT employment. We also document strong similarity between the coefficients on the controls for our main sample and for a sample that excludes hospitals that never adopt,
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suggesting that the control group of hospitals has a similar cost function to the treatment group.
VI. Conclusion
Drawing on a variety of data sources on IT, EMR, local demographics, and hospital characteristics, this study shows that the impact of EMR adoption is consistent with the view of EMR as a business process innovation. While EMR adoption appears to be associated with an increase in costs on average, there is important heterogeneity over time, across technologies, across locations, and across hospitals. Both basic and advanced EMR adoption are initially associated with a rise in costs, and this initial increase in costs is mitigated in hospitals with some internal information technology expertise. After three years, hospitals in IT-intensive locations experience a (significant) 3.4 percent decrease in costs after adopting basic EMR, and a marginally significant 2.2 percent decrease in costs after adopting advanced EMR. These benefits are greatest in locations with a large number of HIT workers, though the benefits of IT-intensive locations appear to extend beyond local expertise in hospital IT. In contrast, hospitals in other locations experience an increase in costs, even after several years.
As with any empirical work, our analysis has a number of limitations. First, we observe only a subset of the medical providers in the United States. Doctors' offices, outpatient clinics, nursing homes, and other medical practices may have had a different experience. While we believe it is likely that the general principles of the prior literature on IT would apply broadly, our evidence is specific to hospitals. Second, we focus on a particular set of EMR technologies over a particular time period. It is possible that the technologies that have arisen since 2009 may be more effective and easier to implement. Third, a key assumption is that hospitals represent a small fraction of local IT expertise and employment. If this is not the case, then our explanation based on complementarities related to co-invention costs is hard to justify.
This study also leaves open questions such as why hospitals adopt if their costs do not fall. It might be due to the pursuit of a societal ideal in spite of the cost, or perhaps misconceptions, expected benefits that we do not measure, the difference between ex ante aspirations and ex post experience, or something else.
We have tried to address the endogeneity of this adoption through various techniques, but we cannot completely rule out the possibility that adopting hospitals in IT-intensive locations adopt because they 30 expect their costs to fall for some reason other than the complementarities of the local IT environment.
Relatedly, though the evidence in the literature is mixed on whether hospitals accrue benefits, such as improved clinical outcomes or reduced errors, it is possible that hospitals outside IT-intensive locations experience a sharp increase in benefits such as clinical outcomes and reduced errors. In that case our findings on reduced costs only tell part of the story.
Despite these limitations, we believe our results help inform the discussion on the "trillion dollar conundrum," providing the (perhaps missing) link between healthcare IT and healthcare costs. Indeed, our results can be restated as a possible resolution to the trillion dollar conundrum. EMR may succeed when the necessary complements are present and the complementary components are in place. Until then, the results of EMR implementation, at best, can be only mixed. While EMR's past mixed performance is no guarantee of a future result, the past experience also is no guarantee of future failure. Over time, complementary IT skills are expected to become more widely available, and the various components more widely deployed. If so, more hospitals will enjoy the benefits of EMR and it may yet fulfill its promise.
